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Torts
Torts; equestrian standard of care
Vehicle Code §21805 (amended).
SB 422 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1973, Ch 495
Vehicle Code Section 21805 provides that the driver of a vehicle
must yield the right of way to any horseback rider crossing a roadway
at a designated equestrian crossing. Section 21759 requires the driver
of a vehicle to slow down or stop as may be necessary when approach-
ing a horse and rider. Section 21805 has been amended to provide
that a horseback rider is not relieved of his duty to use due care
for his own protection even though he has the right of way over ap-
proaching vehicles at a designated equestrian crossing. Section 21805
has also been amended to prohibit the equestrian from suddenly leav-
ing a curb or other place of safety and proceeding into the path of
a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
See Generally:
1) CAL. VEmICLE CODE §21050 (horseback riders subject to all rights and duties
applicable to drivers).
2) 60A CJ.S., Motor Vehicles §§350, 362, 363, 416, 417 (1-969).
Torts; guest statutes repealed
Harbors and Navigation Code §661.1 (repealed); Public Utilities
Code §21406 (repealed); §21404 (amended); Vehicle Code
§17158 (amended).
AB 1094 (Z'berg); STATS 1973, Ch 803
Chapter 803 has been enacted to eliminate the provisions of Cali-
fornia law which deny a guest in an automobile, boat, or airplane
the right to recover from the operator for negligently inflicted injuries.
Prior to amendment, Section 17158 of the Vehicle Code provided that
a person who accepted a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without
having paid compensation for such ride could not recover civil damages
against the driver or other person legally liable, unless the injury or
death resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
Harbors and Navigation Code Section 661.1, which had a similar pro-
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vision applying to guests in boats, and Public Utilities Code Section
21406, applying to guests in airplanes, have also been repealed.
COMMENT
The enactment of Chapter 803 is in response to Brown v. Merlo
[8 Cal. 3d 85, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973)], in which
the California Supreme Court held that Section 17158 of the Vehicle
Code, as applied to a negligently injured guest, violated the guarantees
of the California and United States Constitutions. The court stated
that the statute distinguished between the rights of paying and non-
paying riders, and between different categories of guests (guests in-
jured while in a vehicle as opposed to outside the vehicle, during a
ride as opposed to before or after the ride, and upon a public highway
as opposed to private property), and stated that such classifications
could only be valid if they bore a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest. After an exhaustive analysis the court concluded that
neither the protection of the hospitality of generous drivers nor the
elimination of collusive lawsuits provided a rational basis for the class-
ifications. In rejecting the potentially collusive lawsuit argument, the
court analogized to three cases dealing with intrafamilial immunities
similar to the immunity granted a host-driver [8 Cal. 3d at 874, 506
P.2d at 225, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 401]. In Emery v. Emery [45 Cal.
2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955)] two sisters brought suit for injuries
resulting from their brother's negligent operation of an automobile.
The defendant, represented by his insurer, sought total immunity based
upon the long-standing doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity, claiming
the immunity was justified because of potential fraudulent lawsuits
between family members. The court in Emery stated that it should
be cognizant of fraud and collusion in each particular case, but the
fact that there was greater opportunity for fraud in one class of cases
than in another did not warrant the prohibition of a cause of action
to all cases of that class [45 Cal. 2d at 431, 289 P.2d at 2241.
In Klein v. Klein [58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102, 104-05 (1962)], the same reasoning was used to
reject the claim that the possibility of collusive lawsuits between a
husband and wife served as sufficient justification for barring inter-
spousal negligence actions. Gibson v. Gibson [3 Cal. 3d 914, 919-
20, 479 P.2d 648, 651-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92 (1971)] re-
jected the parallel contention that the broad parental immunity doc-
trine, which barred all negligence actions by children against their
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parents, could be sustained on a collusion prevention rationale. The
court in Brown concluded that these three cases established that it
was unreasonable to eliminate actions of an entire class of persons
simply because some undefined portion of the class may file fraudulent
lawsuits. The court also stated that the guest-passenger classification
scheme was less defensible and less rational than any of the familial
classifications invalidated as it: (1) allowed suits by some who had
no less reason to collude than those barred from bringing a suit (e.g.,
close friends in car pools); and (2) eliminates causes of action of
many individuals as to whom there is no reasonable likelihood of col-
lusion (e.g., hitchhikers) [8 Cal. 3d at 875, 506 P.2d at 226, 106
Cal. Rptr. at 402].
The court found the decision in Rowland v. Christian [69 Cal. 2d
108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968)] applicable in rejecting
the argument that guest statutes were justified because they sought
to protect generous hosts from a suit from ungrateful guests. In Row-
land the common-law distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and
invitees on the property of another were discarded for normal negli-
gence principles. In analogizing this to the guest-passenger distinction,
the court held that just as it is unreasonable to lower the standard
of care owed to a visitor on private property because such visitor is
only a "social guest" rather than a "paying invitee," it is unreasonable
to single out automobile guests and expose them to greater dangers
from negligence than paying passengers [8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d
at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398]. The notion of the ungrateful guest
is also disclaimed by the almost universal presence of liability insur-
ance. The court found no notion of ingratitude in suing a host's
insurer [8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398].
The court in Brown also distinguished Silver v. Silver [280 U.S.
117 (1929)], in which the United States Supreme Court had upheld
the constitutionality of a Connecticut automobile guest statute. In
Silver the plaintiff had attacked the statute solely on the ground that
the distinction drawn between automobile guests and guests in other
conveyances was impermissible. The Supreme Court did not consider
the reasonableness of the two additional statutory distinctions-be-
tween guests and paying passengers and between different categories
of guests-which were attacked in Brown [8 Cal. 3d at 863-64 n.4,
506 P.2d at 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94 n.4]. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court also distinguished the two cases factually, as
Silver was not set against a background of almost universal liability
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insurance and decisions such as Rowland [8 Cal. 3d at 863-64 n.4,
506 P.2d at 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94 n.4]. The court
did not specifically rule on the statutes pertaining to guests in airplanes
or boats as they were not at issue, but logically the court would also
find them unconstitutional if confronted with them.
See Generally:
1) Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
2) 2 WrrxiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFoRNlA LAw, Guest in Motor Vehicle §353 et seq.
(1960).
3) Lasher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1 (1969).
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